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BOTTOM-UP DEVELOPMENT IN HAITI 
This is the fifth in a series of documents concerning Haiti to be made more readily available 
through the University of Kansas Institute of Haitian Studies. We feel the present study, 
although conceived more than fifteen years ago, to be as timely now as when first published, 
and probably even more so. 
With the return on 15 October 1994 of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and the massive 
amount of foreign aid which has been pledged - never before equaled in Haitian history and 
probably never to be repeated - Haiti is at an historic crossroads. It has never been and will 
probably never again be in so favorable a position to rise above its dismal economic past and 
to graduate "from misery to poverty, with dignity" (Aristide). To say that it is essential that 
the most must be made of this opportunity is an understatement. Thus it appears to us that, 
in order to help avoid mistakes of the past, now is an appropriate time to republish one of the 
most penetrating papers on development aid in Haiti. Developing people rather than things, 
consulting the people actually targeted rather than often self-interested bureaucrats far removed 
from rural reality, in other words, the "bottom-up" approach rather than the "top-down" 
approach, is the essential message here. Obviously developing things rather than people is far 
easier, far more rapid, and can be far more readily exhibited to visiting inspection officials, but 
does this constitute true development? The subject here is cosmetic change, as opposed to real 
change. 
Certain statements are worthy of special note. Contrary to what one so often hears, "Peasants 
are not automatically against innovation" (p. 26). Other basics are "local solutions for local 
problems" (p. 59), and the importance of konbit, or communal work teams, for forming a 
nucleus of more extended peasant action (p. 38). 
Although Liberation Theology is never directly mentioned, one could well posit that its very 
essentials are inherent in the ideology and work as described here. But agents of social change 
can only be perceived by those in power as a threat, as so dramatically evidenced by the events 
of the past three years. And one can well see the candidacy of an Aristide as the logical 
continuation, on the national level, of the grass-roots program of conscientization so eloquently 
set forth in this study. 
Bryant Freeman 
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Bottom-up Development in Haiti is the first in a series of 
papers on Latin American and Caribbean development issues. 
These papers will offer some perspectives on Latin Americans1 
and Caribbeans1 self-help efforts to cope with and solve the 
problems of underdevelopment. 
Robert Maguire is a Foundation Representative for the 
Caribbean. Before coming to IAF in May 1979, Mr. Maguire 
was doing doctoral fieldwork in southern Louisiana. 
He is a Ph.D. candidate in geography at McGill University, 
Montreal. The main thrust of his research is socio-economic 
cultural change in black creóle communities in southern 
Louisiana. 
This paper is published by the Inter-American Foundation, 
an independent US Government corporation created under the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1969. The goals of the Foundation, 
as stated in its creating legislation, are to strengthen the 
bond of friendship and understanding among the peoples of 
this hemisphere; support self-help efforts designed to 
enlarge the opportunities for individual development; 
stimulate and assist effective and ever wide participation 
of the people in the development process; and encourage the 
establishment and growth of democratic institutions, private 
and governmental, appropriate to the requirements of the 
individual sovereign nations of this hemisphere. 
Material in this paper is the public domain and may be 
reproduced, fully or partially, without permission, although 
source credit is requested. Permission is required only to 
reproduce copyrighted photographs. 
INTER-AMERICAN FOUNDATION 
1515 Wilson Boulevard 
Rosslyn, Virginia 22209 
INTRODUCTION 
On the road to the village of Belladire in the north of 
Haiti—a road once paved as part of some long-forgotten 
development effort and now mostly potholes—high on a knoll 
overlooking the countryside, sits a relatively large, abandoned, 
cement building, the remains of a school built in the 1950s by a 
non-Haitian development assistance organization. Despite the 
obvious need for improved formal education in the area, this 
building stands empty, rapidly deteriorating in the tropical 
climate. 
Such scenes are common in developing countries. Abandoned 
schools, disintegrating roads, half-finished or decaying 
monuments to good intentions, to frustration, exhaustion of 
funds, lack of planning. But in most cases, there is an 
underlying reason for these scenes—the failure to involve local 
people in the effort. The school in Haiti stands empty because 
the people of the area did not feel a part of the physical 
mutation that simply appeared in their midst. Perhaps they would 
not have identified this building as a first priority. They were 
probably never consulted. 
The frequency of such failed efforts indicates that 
participation and involvement by the people affected is critical 
to the success of any development effort. But how exactly can 
that participation and involvement be encouraged? 
During its 8-1/2 years, the Inter-American Foundation (IAF) 
has funded groups in Latin America and the West Indies that work 
for grassroots social and economic change. In many cases, either 
because groups do not exist in a community, or because of the 
need to transcend the limited constituency a community-based 
group may effectively cover, the Foundation has channeled its 
development funding through local private development 
organizations, called "facilitators," as a more effective means 
of effecting social and economic change. 
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In order to better understand how a facilitator can 
enable a development process to occur at the grassroots, IAF has 
sponsored several case studies of local private development 
organizations it has funded. By understanding how a facilitator 
functions successfully, IAF hopes to become a "better" funder, to 
be able to identify more clearly the characteristics essential 
for a facilitator to promote development beneficial to the broad 
base of a community. It hopes, also, that the lessons learned 
may be of interest and utility to other organizations engaged in 
the struggle for development. 
In this case study, the facilitator organization works in 
peasant leadership training programs in the north of Haiti. The 
Institut Diocésain d'Education des Adults (IDEA) has been active 
Â 
for some five years in a number of communities in that region. 
This study of its efforts reveals insights not only into IDEA'S 
methods and achievements, but into the dynamics of 
underdevelopment in the Haitian countryside, and the efforts of 
other organizations to promote change there. 
The Inter-American Foundation sees development as a process 
that begins with people, not with things. The results of this 
process are measured not in terms of physical or technological 
change, but rather in the change in an individual's or group's 
relative standing within the given social, economic and political 
system. 
Traditionally, "developmentalists" have argued that 
technological and physical change will result in human 
development. The Inter-American Foundation believes rather that 
gains in social development give rise to conditions where the 
underdeveloped themselves identify their needs and then organize 
to satisfy them. Given the dearth of capital resources in 
underdeveloped communities, the Inter-American Foundation assists 
by supplying people at the "base"—or a facilitator—with modest 
amounts of capital. 
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Development efforts assume that underdevelopment 
exists. In the specific case of Haiti, where 94 percent of the 
rural population lives in absolute poverty unable to afford what 
is considered the minimum consumption of food, and other basics, 
such a condition clearly exists. 
When the majority of a people of a particular region, zone, 
or state live in extreme and persistent poverty, their control 
over and access to the resources needed to meet basic human needs 
are severely restricted. Those resources—land and capital in an 
agricultural society—are in the hands of a tiny, powerful elite. 
The inability of the underdeveloped majority to effectively 
manage their own future results in perpetual dependence on this 
elite group and in persistent poverty. In Haiti, specifically, 
the peasant producers of the country's wealth exist at 
subsistence levels and are strongly dependent on a small group of 
economic power brokers who control both basic productive 
resources and the production itself. 
In such a situation, then, efforts to promote a process of 
development should address the fundamental problem of changing 
human relationships that enable greater peasant access to and 
control over resources. 
Development strategies can come from outside the milieu in 
which they are imposed—the "top-down" approach, or from within 
that milieu by the people concerned who then put them into 
effect—the "bottom-up" approach* 
In several studies where Haitian peasants have been asked to 
identify their needs, the most common responses have dealt with 
very concrete physical infrastructural change (Zuvekas: 1978a 
and Gow: 1977). Needed irrigation systems, roads, schools, and 
health clinics, along with improvements to agricultural 
infrastructure in areas such as provision of fertilizers, 
pesticides, and agricultural credit were commonly identified. 
Whether realization of these physical or technological changes 
result in actual improvement in the productive capability of the 
peasant and his relative standing within the social, economic 
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and political system of the society in which he lives, however, 
is doubtful. Change in physical conditions do not necessarily 
lead to human development. Rather, they can very well result 
in mere mutations of the surroundings that do not change the 
critical factor of underdevelopment—social and economic 
relationships—at all. 
But not all the development needs identified by Haitian 
peasants are physical, infrastructural, or technological changes. 
In its ongoing survey of peasant needs in the north, IDEA has 
found that peasants always place justice, rights, and the need to 
gain control and ownership of land high on this list of 
priorities. These desires suggest the need for changes in social 
relations. An understanding of how development efforts 
facilitate the achievement of these needs, and hence changes in 
social and economic relationships, is basic to any attempt at 
development• 
HAITIAN UNDERDEVELOPMENT 
Haiti's unfortunate status as the least developed country in 
the Western Hemisphere has been well-documented in a number of 
reports, by the U.S. Agency for International Development, the 
World Bank, the United Nations, and others. 
The health situation is the worst in the hemisphere. Infant 
mortality rates are 150 per 1,000 and the average adult life 
expectancy is 47 years (Gow: 1977). Mortality rates for 
children under five is ten times that of developed countries 
(USAID: 1977). Three percent of Haitians have tuberculosis; 
malaria and illnesses due to malnutrition are widespread; and 
there was only one doctor to every 13,210 people, one nurse to 
every 7,460, one hospital bed to every 1,370 (World Bank: 1975). 
Sixty percent of all Haitian children suffer from mal-
nutrition, almost 25 percent of them from second and third-degree 
malnutrition, and the average daily caloric intake of 1,700 is 
well below the Haitian minimum requirement of 2,214 (Zuvekas: 
1978b). In 1974, of 129 developing countries, Haiti was 127th in 
per capita daily caloric consumption and 129th in protein 
consumption. 
Some 80 percent of the adult population is illiterate. The 
government spends about $1 per person per year on education. 
Only 26 percent of all rural children aged 6-12 attend school 
(Zuvekas: 1978b). 
An estimated 87 percent of the employed population receive 
less than US$240 annually. Income in rural areas is estimated at 
$55 annually. Two-thirds of the rural population have annual 
incomes below $40 (World Bank: 1975). 
These are the grave living conditions of the rural poor. An 
examination of man-land relations, land tenure and distribution, 
and of the concentration of power and deep divisions in Haitian 
society show why they exist. 
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The Land 
Haiti is a country of peasant farmers. Roughly 80 percent 
or four million of Haiti's five million people live in the 
countryside. Given Haiti's small size—roughly that of 
Maryland—this means an average population density of 470 people 
per square mile. The intense pressure on the land exists 
everywhere in the countryside, not just in small, isolated 
pockets. The problems are ubiquitous as well. 
Haiti has a wide variety of land types, from valley and 
coastal plain to plateau, but the dominant type is mountain 
range. About four-fifths of the country is laced with moun-
tain ranges and hills. Almost half the total land surface 
consists of mountainous land with a slope greater than 40 
degrees, and only about one-seventh of the total land surface is 
flat or sloped at less than 10 degrees (Zuvekas: 1978a). Land 
with a 40 degree slope is hard to stand on without falling off, 
hence not at all suitable for intense cultivation (See Figure 
One). 
With so much marginal land, and very high density, the 
people either squeeze onto the good land or try to use the 
marginal land as best they can. With virtually all optimal 
agricultural land already in use or under control, the steeply 
sloping land suitable only for grazing, forest, or perhaps tree 
crops is increasingly brought under cultivation and the results 
are predictable—and grave. Massive soil erosion and other forms 
of environmental degradation are increasing constantly, posing a 
grave threat to Haiti's future. Deforestation not only is 
destroying the land, causing gullying, droughts, and floods; it 
also threatens the main Haitian fuel source—charcoal. The UN 
predicts that the charcoal industry will not be able to satisfy 
demand for more than ten years, resulting in a nation-wide crisis 
(Conservation Foundation: 1977). 
The mountains that so dominate the Haitian landscape produce 
isolation. Transportation and communications networks are weak. 
Only 15 percent of the nation's 2,328 miles of roadway are paved. 
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Figure 1: Haiti 
Atlantic Ocean 
Market places are served by either poor roads or no roads at 
all. This inaccessibility and isolation are barriers to 
development although they are resolutely overcome by those who 
covet the countryside's resources. 
The basic resource is the land. Given the high population 
density, one would expect that average land holdings are small, 
and such is the case. Microfundia, defined as farms of less than 
3.19 acres (one carreau), account for 71 percent of all farms 
according to 1971 census figures. But that covers only 32.5 
percent of the total farm area. If farms up to 6.4 acres are 
included, the percentage jumps to 88.9 percent, and the total 
farm area covered rises to 58.6 percent. Only five percent of 
all Haitian farmers hold more than 9.6 acres (See Table One). 
In 1971, the average farm size in Haiti was 3.5 acres. 
While Haiti, unlike other Latin American countries, is not 
dominated by large land-owners, an important latifundia of sorts 
does exist. Farms of 25 acres and over, although comprising only 
4,835 holdings, or 0.8 percent of all holdings, cover 180,522 
acres, or 8.4 percent of the total farming area. And this 
appears to be a very conservative estimate of larger land 
holdings. While these data support the contention that 
latifundia does not dominate the countryside as it does in other 
Latin American countries, a deeper look is needed to understand 
the real impact of control over land. 
First, with regard to the number of large land holdings and 
their size, "there is little doubt that the [census] data 
understate the number of large landholdings and the area they 
occupy. The 1971 census, for example, shows no farms of more 
than 15.50 carreaux (49.4 acres) in the West [Department]; but 
one does not have to drive very far out of Port-au-Prince to see 
visible evidence to the contrary. [Also] some large sisal and 
sugar plantations [in the north] clearly were not counted" 
(Zuvekas: 1978a: 96). Hence, the domination of the latifundia 
is greater than census figures show. 
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TABLE ONE 
LAND DISTRIBUTION IN HAITI (1971) 
1 Farm Size | No. of 1 % of 1 Cumula-1 Area In % of Cumula- 1 
1 (Acres) | Farms 1 Farms 1 tive % 1 Farms Area tive % 1 
1 .032-,27 1 16,820 1 2.7 1 2.7 1 2,712 1 0.1 0.1 1 
1 .28-.51 1 36,050 1 5.9 1 8.6 1 14,339 0.7 0.8 1 
1 .52-.8 1 107,480 1 17.4 1 26.0 1 87,438 4.1 4.9 1 
1 .81-1.21 1 28,485 1 4.6 I 30.6 1 32,602 1.5 6.4 1 
1 1.22-1.6 1 104,890 1 17.0 1 47.6 1 162,834 7.6 14.0 1 
1 1:61-2.5 1 68,260 1 11.1 1 58.7 1 157,171 7.4 21.4 1 
1 2.51-3.2 1 76,010 1 12.3 1 71.0 1 237,926 11.1 32.5 1 
1 3.21-4.94 1 65,920 1 10.7 81.7 1 286,175 13.4 ! 45.9 1 
1 4.95-6.39 1 44,340 1 7.2 88.9 1 272,171 1 12.7 1 58.6 1 
1 6.40-7.43 1 9,260 1 1*5 90.4 67,500 1 3.2 1 61.8 1 
1 7.44-9.60 1 27,370 1 4.4 94.8 [ 239,282 1 11.2 1 73.0 1 
1 9.61-12.34 1 8,440 1 1-4 ! 96.2 95,923 1 4.5 1 77.5 1 
1 12.35-12.76 1 4,300 1 0.7 96.9 54,709 1 2.6 1 80.1 1 
1 12.77-16.00 1 7,810 1 1*3 1 98.2 118,668 1 5.6 1 85.7 1 
1 16.01-24.9 1 6,440 1 i-o 1 99.2 125,399 1 5.9 J 91.6 1 
1 25-32 1 2,660 1 0.4 1 99.6 72,126 1 3.4 1 95.0 1 
1 32.1-47.9 1 1,285 1 0.2 1 99.8 49,381 1 2.3 1 97.3 1 
1 48-63.8 1 590 1 o.i 1 99.9 32,729 1 1.5 1 98.8 1 
(More than 63.8| 300 1 o.i 1 100.0 26,286 1 1.2 1 100.0 1 
1 Total 1 616,710 1100.0 1 100.0 2,135,370 1 100.0 1 100.0 1 
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Second, because of the mountainous terrain, optimal 
agricultural land is a scarce commodity* Of a total land surface 
of 5,898,851 acres, one report says only 1,914,000 acres are 
suitable for crops. Of this figure, an estimated 1,100,000 acres 
(57 percent) are in mountainous areas and are marginal for annual 
crop production (LeBeau: 1974). Another report estimates that 
of the total land area, only 1,722,323 acres is land with slopes 
less than 10 degrees. Much of this good land is under the 
control of the large landowners. Most of it is either under-
utilized, extensively used for cattle raising, or planted in 
export crops such as sugar cane or sisal, or in rice. 
Although the nation*s land is divided among most of Haiti's 
people—some 60 to 80 percent of all farmers claim they own their 
land—the division is not at all equal. While many peasants work 
on land not well suited for cultivation, the elite group controls 
significant quantities of prime agricultural land and marginal 
land as well. The State also plays a significant role in land 
holding. It is not clear just how much land the State owns, nor 
how much of it is suitable for agriculture, but the State is 
perhaps the biggest landowner in Haiti (Zuvekas: 1978a). 
Hence, Haiti's land is divided among three principle 
owners—microfundia, latifundia, and the State. Essentially 
there are four main types of land tenure in Haiti: individual 
ownership, renting from the State, renting from a private owner, 
and sharecropping. Although private ownership of land clearly 
dominates land tenure statistics, mixed forms of tenure are 
common. There are innumerable situations where owners of one or 
two small parcels cannot subsist on their marginal holdings and 
commonly rent additional land, sharecrop, or supplement low 
earnings with seasonal agricultural wage labor (Zuvekas: 1978a 
and Gow: 1977). 
Even though the majority of Haitian peasant farmers 
identify themselves as landowners, there is no indication of 
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how many of them actually have clear title to their land. No 
cadastral survey has ever been made in Haiti, but empirical data 
suggest that relatively few hold clear title (Zuvekas: 1978a). 
Farmers at least in theory, control their entire harvest, 
selling it either on the local market or to the local 
representative of an export agent. Farmers supply all 
agricultural inputs and manage their land themselves. 
However, several factors limit the extent to which farmers 
actually control their harvest, or even their land. 
Since renters and sharecroppers have no security on the land 
they work, investment is discouraged. Instead, they tend to 
overwork the land to produce a maximum yearly harvest, often at 
the cost of environmental damage. This lack of security also 
affects the peasant freehold farmers who rarely have clear title. 
Facing the very real possibility of appropriation of their land 
by a gros nèg ("big shot"), farmers are also discouraged from 
investing in their land, and encouraged to overwork it. There 
are substantiated reports of land-grabs, of judges bribed to 
issue competing land titles, of extortion by locally powerful 
quasi-governmental authorities. The situation of insecure tenure 
arrangements is the most severe and debilitating constraint to 
peasant development in Haiti. But there are several other 
constraints as well. 
Neither owner-operators, sharecroppers, nor renters have any 
control over prices or markets. Their only access to credit is 
at usurious rates—100 percent or higher. Storage facilities are 
limited or non-existent, which forces peasants to glut the market 
at harvest time, when they receive the lowest prices. 
Obviously, peasants are at the mercy of forces beyond their 
individual control. Caught in a vicious cycle of debt they can 
never climb above pure subsistence. There is little or no 
possibility of improvement of agricultural conditions by 
individual peasants. They are at the bottom rung in a situation 
where access to and control of resources are vested in a select 
few. One begins to understand not only why peasants identify 
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justice as one of their needs, but also the extent of the 
injustice imposed upon them. It becomes obvious why changes in 
the physical infrastructure—roads, irrigation systems, 
markets—will not benefit peasants if they remain in their 
present condition of dependency. Indeed, infrastructural change 
may actually lead to their further underdevelopment. Any 
improvements to the land itself, or in access to the land may 
well "only pave the way for land-grabbing by the relatively 
wealthy under a cloak of legality" and result in peasant 
disenfranchisement from the land (Zuvekas: 1978a: 260). 
The peasants then are powerless and extremely dependent on 
those with power. Who are the powerful and how is power 
concentrated in their hands? 
Society 
The Haitian class structure is a "pecking order" in which 
those at the top hold power at a national level—large landowners 
and merchants, political and administrative heads, a small, 
elite, and overlapping group. The middle of the pecking order is 
composed of those with power at the local level—middle-sized 
landowners, medium-sized merchants and speculators, local minor 
political and administrative officials, and individuals with 
specific trades and professions. At the bottom is the great 
majority—the peasant landowners, renters, and sharecroppers, 
landless wage and family laborers, market women and petty 
merchants (Figure Two). 
Income distribution in Haiti illustrates the disparities, 
particularly the concentration of wealth in the urban centers, 
Port-au-Prince above all. Estimates of GNP and personal income 
for 1975 for rural and urban areas show vast differences between 
the two areas. Average urban GNP is $321 higher than average 
rural GNP, and urban/rural personal income differentials are 
$289. Since 94 percent of the rural population lives in 
conditions of absolute poverty and two-thirds of that population 
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FIGURE TWO 
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has an annual average income of less than US$40, there must be a 
small group of rural residents living at relatively high levels. 
These are the "brokers" of the urban-based Haitian power 
merchants. 
A better notion of the concentration of wealth in Haiti is 
attained when one realizes that, as of 1976, roughly 5 percent of 
Haiti's population accumulated more than 50 percent of the 
national income, and the average per capita income in the highest 
bracket is 184 times that of the bottom bracket (IHS: 1977). 
According to the same source, approximately 7,000 families 
in Haiti have average annual incomes exceeding $50,000. Of this 
group, about 3,000 families live in the Port-au-Prince area and 
have an average annual income estimated at almost $100,000 (IHS: 
1977). 
Additional indicators of the urban/rural dichotomy and the 
concentration of wealth and power in the urban milieu are found 
in other statistics: 
- Eighty-three percent of Haiti's FY1975/76 ex-
penditures were in Port-au-Prince, which holds 
roughly only 20 percent of Haiti's population. 
- Ninety percent of all Haiti's industrial activities 
are centered in Port-au-Prince (IHS: 1977). 
There is then a classic center/periphery system where the 
center extracts from the periphery to develop the center. The 
only re-investment at the periphery is that necessary to maintain 
or extend the extraction network. For example, building feeder 
roads in the name of agricultural development may only reinforce 
peasant underdevelopment by facilitating the further extraction 
of resources from the rural producers, without any necessary 
change in their status. 
The concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a 
small elite in the capital gives rise to a centralization in 
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decision-making that contributes strongly to the under-
development of rural areas. Administrative and financial 
autonomy at the regional or community level is totally 
insignificant. It only follows that government policies and 
services cater mostly to the urban sector. 
In addition, the highly centralized and concentrated system 
leaves little room for organization at the local level. There 
are no formal, legally recognized organizations at the community 
level which represent peasant interests. Thus there is a lack of 
initiative at that level. Actions are stymied, talent and 
resources drained, and a massive sense of fatalism that all 
decisions are in the hands of others is pervasive. 
The urban-rural dichotomy is reinforced by a cultural 
dichotomy which affects underdevelopment of the peasantry* This 
dichotomy is between what is "official'1 in Haitian culture and 
what is "tolerated." The "official" represents the city, the 
citadin (townsman) and those with power, whereas the "tolerated" 
represents those outside the city, the paysan (peasant), and in 
general, those at the bottom. Thus, French language, the 
Catholic religion, marriage, and health care in hospitals are 
parts of the official culture; while Creole, Voudou religion, 
common law marriage, and folk medicine are "tolerated." (See 
Table Two). There is a strong correlation between the official 
culture and the lifestyle and cultural mores of the small, 
powerful elite; as there is between what is merely "tolerated" 
and the lifestyle and cultural mores of the peasants, 80 percent 
of the Haitian population. One can easily imagine the 
debilitating effects on the collective psyche of the vast 
majority of the people when they are considered inferior simply 
for being themselves. This fortifies the peasantry1s own belief 
Y 
in its natu^.1 inferiority, its acceptance of its poverty, and its 
inability to do anything about the situation. It also fortifies 
the assumption that peasants, by virtue of their "inferiority," 
exist to serve the townsmen, who live in the superior, "official" 
world.i 
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TABLE 2 
DUALITY IN HAITIAN CULTURE 
Official Tolerated 
language 
religion 
French Creole 
Catholicism Voudou 
health care 
sexual union Marriage 
Hospital 
Plajage (common law) 
"Dr. Fey" 
(folk medicine) 
In today's world, for the majority of Haitians to live in a 
situation where they believe themselves inferior because of their 
cultural practices is a blatant anachronism. Eventually, as part 
of their development needs, it will become clear that the Haitian 
peasantry seeks to practice its culture and have its majority 
status recognized. Perhaps the peasant's desire for justice 
represents, in part, this yearning for cultural legitimation. 
This then is the situation of underdevelopment in Haiti, and 
the structures that enforce it. How have agencies seeking to 
encourage development, both from within and without Haiti, 
dealt with this situation? 
t Interviews with Haitian peasant leaders have brought out 
the fact that not only do peasants accept their lot as 'natural', 
they have come to believe that there is no alternative to it. A 
supporting example comes from a story related by a member of the 
urban elite. 
After years of visiting the country and returning to town 
laden with gifts of fruit and other produce from peasants, this 
individual came to realize that peasants, by offering their 
precious produce to townsmen, were not necessarily doing so out 
of the kindness of their hearts or their urge to share and to be 
generous, as townsmen have been led to believe. Rather, peasants 
give freely of their valuable produce because, in their eyes and 
in the eyes of society, they grow up believing that they have to 
give to the townsmen; this is expected of them, the inferior 
ones. 
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DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS IN HAITI 
Starting in the 1960s, a wave of "development 
madness" began to sweep over Haiti, and it has continued since. 
It reaches into virtually every isolated pocket of the country 
with some activity having some kind of impact. In 1976 there 
were some 146 international, multinational, bilateral, or 
non-governmental agencies with operations in Haiti (united 
Nations: 1977), approximately one development agency for every 
33,000 Haitians. And this figure does not include the many 
Government of Haiti development agencies. The vast majority of 
these 146 agencies were religious or secular service 
organizations. Ten were international, ten bilateral, and four 
multilateral. 
The agencies varied tremendously in size, budget, type and 
number of projects, united Nations estimates put total 
multilateral and bilateral aid in 1976 at $68.7 million, and aid 
from non-governmental agencies at another $12.3 million, probably 
a serious underestimation (UN: 1977). 
The activities are as numerous as the organizations. The 
major development agencies have, identified special sectors into 
which they channel their development budgets, personnel, and 
activities, and often concentrate their efforts in a particular 
region or department (See Table Three). 
Three development strategies have been followed—the 
integrated project where several activities are undertaken in a 
small area; the regional, single-activity project and the 
national or regional project concerned with one type of activity 
but set in a very local area. With many agencies pursuing one or 
more strategies, Haiti today is, as one writer put it, "a 
veritable gallery of the forms of rural development activities" 
(Girault: 1977; 4 ) . 
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TABLE THREE 
DEVELOPMENT AGENCY INTEREST SECTORS 
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GOH Government of Haiti 
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization 
WFP World Food Program 
WHO/PAO World Health Organization/Pan American Health 
Organization 
UNICEF U.N. International Children1s Education Fund 
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development 
OAS Organization of American States 
IDB Inter-American Development Bank 
USAID U.S. Agency for International Development 
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency 
FAC French Aid and Cooperation 
GOWG Government of West Germany 
HACHO Haitian American Community Help Organization 
CWS Church World Services 
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So many development agencies are active because the UN has 
classified Haiti as one of the world's 25 poorest countries. As 
such, it is eligible for the most intense activities of the UN 
Development Program, and draws increased attention from 
multilateral and bilateral donors as well as religious and 
charitable organizations. 
What difference do these programs make? Is Haiti be-
coming "developed"? To fully answer those questions is beyond 
the limited scope of this monograph; but the discussion in the 
previous pages suggests a negative answer. To see why this may 
be so, an examination of the activities of typical development 
organizations seem appropriate. Two will be discussed: the US 
Agency for International Development (USAID or AID), a 
governmental organization working through the Government of 
Haiti, and the Haitian American Community Help Organization 
(HACHO), a local non-governmental organization. 
USAID 
The Agency for International Development has been active in 
Haiti since 1970, when the U.S. resumed development efforts after 
a ten-year absence. Currently, AID finances diverse projects and 
its impact in Haiti is significant. Its 1978 budget there was 
just under $16 million. In 1975, when its budget was 
considerably smaller, it represented seven percent of the 
Government of Haiti's total expenditures (USAID: 1977). 
The Agency's objectives in Haiti are: 
to help rural inhabitants achieve a better life by 
developing local institutions which participate in 
programs to increase production and income in rural 
Haiti, and create a framework for government programs 
to provide essential services in rural Haiti; to 
strengthen government and private 
institutions—particularly those involved in rural 
development and in providing health and family planning 
services—which in turn will help to create local 
institutions able to provide essential services and to 
introduce new ideas to the people of rural Haiti 
(Zuvekas: 1978a; 322). 
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As its basic development strategy, AID follows 
essentially a top-down approach. Projects and activities are 
identified, planned, and administered by AID officials and 
contractors and the Haitian government. The assumption is that 
the benefits will fall upon those for whom the projects are 
enacted, that is the rural poor. With this approach, the 
beneficiary of the development intervention plays a passive role. 
The thrust comes from outside. The process is supported by high 
capital expenditures often related to some kind of physical 
change such as the construction of a road or buildings. 
Agency activities in Haiti are grouped under five major 
headings—food and nutrition, population planning, health, 
education and human resource development, and selected 
development activities. Most activity is in the food and 
nutrition area where AID has programs in rural community 
development, agricultural development, road maintenance, small 
farmer development, agricultural feeder roads, nutrition 
improvement, integrated agricultural development, and small 
farmer marketing. 
A look at one example, the Small Farmer Development project, 
provides useful insights into how AID works. That project seeks 
to raise the production and incomes of small coffee farmers. 
Coffee has been the base of Haitian exports for over 150 years. 
Small farmers are the primary producers. An elaborate system 
based on speculators and urban-based négociants has evolved to 
control marketing and export. 
In 1974, AID signed a $6 million agreement with the 
Government of Haiti for a five-year program to improve 
coffee production. The program was to modernize the coffee 
production sector by setting up six centers which would 
demonstrate modern methods, by building and improving some 38 
miles of feeder roads into coffee zones, and by financing the 
purchase of some 14,000 tons of coffee fertilizer from U.S. 
sources to be sold to farmers cultivating roughly 13 acres of 
coffee or less. 
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When planning the coffee project, U.S. and Haitian 
officials decided that the modernization of the coffee sector 
would be best done through a program heavily focused on 
fertilizer use (Girault: 1977). Of the $6 million budgeted, $5 
million was earmarked for buying fertilizer. To enable small 
farmers to buy fertilizers, credit societies (SAC) composed of 
small groups of peasant coffee producers were to be formed. For 
the first few years of the program, the fertilizer would be sold 
at prices below the market value to encourage farmers to take up 
its use. Progressively, prices would rise to market levels. 
The thrust of the project and the way it evolved 
demonstrate how AID development strategy works: 
Needs were identified by various experts, and the project 
was planned at the top. Participation by coffee farmers in 
planning and management was minimal. Project actions appeared 
from the outside—for example, a cadre of technicians moved into 
selected areas to promote them. To participate in the credit 
program, a small farmer had to join a group overseen by a Haitian 
government agency. Government experts directed the project at 
all levels of management and decision-making. 
The first steps were the construction of roads and coffee 
centers—physical changes on the landscape—with simultaneous 
efforts to get the peasant beneficiaries to understand the 
significance of the project so they would then participate. 
Introduction of technology, i.e., the use of fertilizer, was the 
keystone of the whole project. 
While the project is not yet completed, and a final verdict 
is therefore impossible, several weaknesses are apparent. One of 
the coffee centers was located in Thiotte, an important coffee 
area, but one without many penetration roads and with extremely 
mountainous terrain, making participation by small coffee 
farmers in the surrounding area unlikely. In addition, the karst 
(limestone) topography means there is often a serious lack of 
surface water at Thiotte, making it impractical to install a 
coffee bean depulping and washing operations, both critical to 
the center's activities. 
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In spite of these constraints, the center was located in 
Thiotte, and a good part of the loan for fertilizer went to that 
zone. Thiotte is the home of the man who was the Minister of 
Agriculture at the time the decisions on locating the centers 
were made. He is also a large-scale coffee producer, as are many 
of his neighbors. American assistance funds destined for the 
small coffee planters of Haiti were concentrated in the only 
region of the country where one finds a relatively homogenous 
group of large planters (Girault: 1977: 18, 21). 
Another coffee center was placed "in marginal territory 
from the point of view of the ecology of coffee, because it is at 
an altitude too low: 250 meters (roughly 810 feet). But it has 
been chosen because one finds there a demonstration farm of the 
Department of Agriculture, although it is in ruins after the 
passage of a hurricane during the 1960s. . ." 
(Girault: 1977: 18). 
From these examples, it is clear that such projects are 
subject to political pressures which may skew them away from the 
overall goals, particularly the goal of benefitting small 
farmers. 
There are additional problems. The fertilizer program is 
behind schedule for two reasons—the slow and rigid procedures 
for disbursing credit, and the farmers1 hesitancy about adopting 
the use of fertilizer. The loan program is complex and tangled 
in the red tape of the issuing agency (the Bureau of Agricultural 
Credit). During the first several years of the program, farmers 
have been slow in demanding fertilizer, a common phenomenon given 
peasant farmers1 low-risk agricultural strategies. There have 
also been some bad experiences with fertilizer-burned trees where 
fertilizer was applied too intensively, sometimes by agronomists 
and agricultural agents at the coffee center. Peasants however 
are not automatically against innovation. 
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Field surveys in northern Haiti have shown peasants to be 
generally amendable to taking small risks, providing they 
understand the possibilities for gain and have decided 
themselves to take the risk (Maguire: 1978a). 
Another drawback to planning from the top is the 
frequent misunderstanding of peasant reality. In this case, 
for example, defining a small coffee farmer as one with up to 
13 acres in production ignores the realities of Haitian land 
distribution. Farmers with more than 10 acres of coffee are most 
likely members of the local elite. 
But perhaps the most basic problem with the project is the 
overall rationale. Girault argues that the attempt to modernize 
an agricultural sector through massive capital inputs is unlikely 
to promote meaningful development for small farmers. The 
fundamental causes of their underdevelopment—the inequities of 
the social relationships that dominate both the marketing system 
and the land tenure arrangements, and that keep peasants 
dependent—are not addressed by the project's activities. Until 
they are, those on top will benefit from development, while those 
on the bottom gain little or nothing. 
HACHO 
The Haitian American Community Help Organization was created 
in 1966 to furnish technical and material aid to the fcforthwest, 
Haiti's poorest region. It seeks to stimulate peasants in that 
zone to embrace principles qf cooperativism and to assist them in 
their socio-economic development. It started with four 
employees, now employs some 170 people, primarily Haitians, and 
has hundreds of workers in rural community development activities 
in its network. 
As a semi-private development organization, HACHO re-
ceives funding from several sources, primarily American. AID 
provides the bulk of the organization's support through its Food 
for Work (FFW) program. CARE and the Church World Service also 
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provide assistance. The Government of Haiti contributes small 
sums of operating capital and some heavy equipment and personnel. 
Clearly, HACHO differs from AID in several fundamental ways. 
Its personnel are active in the field. It is a smaller 
organization with a smaller operating budget. In principle, at 
least, it is not tied exclusively to one organization or 
institution for support or approval of its activities. It is 
active in one specific region, thus has more direct contact with 
the community level. 
The Organization provides assistance in health, community 
development, agriculture and education. Roughly one-half of its 
budget goes into health. HACHO typically works through local 
community councils, providing them with technical and financial 
resources to carry out community development projects. The local 
councils are a relatively recent development in Haiti, created 
over the last ten years through central government^^initiatives. 
In 1975-76, individual community councils inAfibrthwest began 
to request specific assistance from HACHO. After a year of 
involvement, however, HACHO felt that the community 
council-identified activities were not successful primarily 
because the councils were unable to set priorities and establish 
cohesive work plans. HACHO addressed this by providing trained 
animation agents to the councils. According to several sources, 
this has not worked to expectations in most cases (field 
interviews and Gow: 1977). There appear to be three primary 
problems—the structure of the councils, the preparation of the 
animators, and the way Pood for Work is used. 
The gravest problem with the community councils is that 
their leadership, vested in an executive committee, tends to come 
from the local gros nèg. Executive committee members on the 
average have a family income more than double that of regular 
council members (Gow: 1977: 18). The poorest members of a 
community do not even join the councils. 
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Peasant participation in identifying and planning pro-
grams is therefore certain to be stifled within the councils 
because of the domination by individuals who exercise power over 
them* Problems identified an may even be those 
that will primarily benefit the grog nèg, and perhaps not benefit 
peasants atall._ One example occurred in a community where the 
council sought to improve irrigation on land close to a town, 
land controlled by the same elite group that dominates the 
council. In this instance, peasant council members worked, 
through a Food for Work grant made by HACHO, to provide more land 
with water. But the project did not improve conditions for those 
peasants who live beyond this small enclave. Nor did it help 
the peasants who rent this land, since it led to increased rents. 
The problem with the animators is that, although they 
frequently come from the bottom sector of society, for vari-
ous reasons they often wind up supporting the local elite. This 
happens sometimes because the animators, not being from the 
community in which they work, seek economic and personal 
security, which the local power brokers can most easily grant. 
In addition, the animators receive a high enough salary from 
HACHO to immediately place them in a relatively elite position in 
the community. Anyone with a sizeable, dependable salary in a 
village—a rare phenomenon—is immediately ascribed gros neg 
status, and apparently animators readily accept it. Some of them 
even become landowners, and rent their land to those with whom 
they are supposed to be working. Their ineffectiveness as change 
agents becomes complete when they reach the point where they 
defend the status quo instead of seek to change social 
relationships. 
Food for Work is a controversial program. All corners of 
the Haitian development community have criticized it for a 
potentially strong, negative impact on community development. 
Under the program, peasants are given surplus food for their 
participation in some community development activity. They tend 
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to regard it as payment for work, and thus do not acquire any new 
attitudes about the possibility of working together for 
development of their communities* Often, when Food for Work is 
no longer available, peasants stop working, sometimes even 
leaving a project incomplete. 
From this overview, it becomes apparent that some of the 
same weaknesses that plague AID efforts affect HACHO. There is a 
total lack of participation by peasants in the identification of 
needs, planning of activities, and the management and control of 
projects. The thrust for development seems to come from outside. 
Activities aim at changing "things" rather than social 
relationships. Since changing things often involves massive 
inputs of capital, technology, and machinery, the activities are 
beyond the control of the beneficiaries and tend to reinforce the 
attitude that development is something done for people, but not 
necessarily b£ the people themselves. 
These development interventions make very little difference 
to the intended target population—the poorest of the poor. With 
the millions of dollars of development assistance pouring into 
Haiti and the myriad development organizations and activities, 
the people at the bottom are still hungry, still trapped in 
underdevelopment and dependency. 
-30-
DEVELOPMENT FROM THE BOTTOM UP 
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Although their development needs are diverse, for Haitian 
peasants to improve their productive capability and their 
relative standing within the social, economic, and political 
system of which they are a part, human development must come 
before physical development. The opposite sequence results, as 
has been seen, in some initial physical mutation, but not 
necessarily in subsequent human development of the peasantry. 
Haitian peasants identify justice as a need they feel. To 
facilitate a development process that has a chance of 
attaining increased justice, it is necessary to make that often 
used term concrete. Clearly, the picture of Haitian 
underdevelopment demonstrates that peasants suffer grave 
conditions of injustice. There are several areas where 
improvements in social relationships are needed. Peasants need, 
for example: 
• greater security on the land and legitimation of their 
ownership through provision of clear legal titles; 
• access to credit at fair interest rates; 
• increased access to and control over good agricultural 
lands ; 
• legitimation of their lifestyle and cultural mores; 
• increased capability to influence decisions, to initiate 
local activities, and to exercise local autonomy; 
• a more even distribution of wealth and services. 
To meet these needs, fundamental social and economic 
relationships have to change. If these changes occur, and the 
needs are realized, development at the base can take place and 
injustices can be eliminated. 
Before looking directly at IDEA, the facilitator agency 
working to bring about these changes, a brief overview of one of 
the settings for IDEA'S efforts, the parish of Le Borgne, will be 
given. 
Le Borgne 
Le Borgne parish on the mountainous north coast of Haiti 
consists of the town of the same name and 55 habitations 
surrounding it. Some 1,765 families, a total population of 8,987 
people, live within its 22 square miles, slightly under a third 
of them in the town itself (Charest & Jean-Baptiste: 1976). The 
population density of the parish is 408 people per square mile, 
lower than the national average but still indicating intense 
pressure on the land. 
Le Borgne was chartered by the King of France around 1760. 
It was a seaport of significance, exporting locally grown 
produce, first in colonial times, and again some 35 to 40 years 
ago, during a banana boom. Coffee and cacao were the dominant 
colonial crops but today there are no signs of large plantation 
activities. 
After the Haitian revolution, French and mulattoes dis-
appeared from Le Borgne and the revolutionary leadership granted 
land to loyal military officers, thus establishing a local black 
landowning elite. Peasants probably claimed or at least occupied 
land on the peripheral areas of the parish. Since the 
revolution, the town has served as a minor center of commerce for 
the surrounding habitations. Several local families, presumably 
those with the most extensive landholdings, emerged as small-
scale merchants and assumed roles of local leadership. These 
families, however, although landowners, tended not to have much 
operating capital. Hence, their position, while important 
locally, was not significant on a national or even regional 
scale. 
The parish's leading gros nèg family first arrived in Le 
Borgne in the late 1890s. Its patriarch was a Port-au-Prince 
merchant who came to Le Borgne with capital, set up a large 
store, and began to provide credit to farmers and acquire 
mortgages. Subsequent natural disasters, bad harvests, or low 
prices provided opportunities for foreclosure and the merchant 
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began to accumulate land. He eventually became the parish's 
largest merchant, largest coffee speculator and dealer, and the 
only cacao-buying agent by exclusive government license. 
The patriarch is now dead, but his grandchildren con-
tinue to manage family operations. They buy virtually the entire 
local coffee crop and ship it to Port-au-Prince in family-owned 
trucks. The landholdings collected over the years are rented to 
individual families. Today, this family is the largest 
landholder in the parish, with the possible exception of the 
State. Of course there are several other local families with 
similar operations, but on a smaller scale. 
Until recently, Le Borgne was largely isolated from the rest 
of the country behind the surrounding mountains. Until 1950, 
there was no direct road link with the outside. All contact with 
administrative centers such as Cap-Haïtien was either by foot, 
animal transport, or the sea. 
During the late 1930s and early 1940s, Le Borgne enjoyed 
relative prosperity brought on by a brief banana boom* It was 
around this time that land holdings appear to have been 
consolidated and the present distribution of land took shape. 
The boom collapsed shortly after it began, returning Le Borgne to 
its position as a minor center of commerce. Today the only local 
product that leaves by boat is people—individuals in small, 
fragile vessels seeking economic refuge in Miami or the Bahamas. 
Le Borgne is representative of underdevelopment in Haiti, 
replicating the conditions outlined above for the whole country: 
• In health, for example, 64 percent of the population of Le 
Borgne showed evidence of some general sickness, fever, or 
tuberculosis; 50 percent had symptoms of parasites; 42 percent 
suffered from malnutrition; potable water was unavailable; 
infant mortality in rural areas was 26 percent. 
• In education, 78 percent of the adults were illiterate; 61 
percent never went to school; the closest secondary school is 
28 miles away in Cap-Haïtien. 
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• No data were available on income but the poverty of the vast 
majority of Le Borgne1s people is visible: 65 percent live in 
two-room mud houses with a sheet iron roof and another 33 
percent in even cheaper houses of mud and straw. Only two 
percent had concrete houses. While 88 percent of all families 
live on agriculture, only 10 percent of farmers had a hoe, 
only six percent a pick. 
The Land 
The physical geography of Le Borgne parish is rugged. 
Mountains rise in most places along the coast, leaving only one 
small coastal plain west of the village. With 88 percent of the 
families engaging in agriculture, not only is all tillable land 
intensely worked, but many marginal areas as well. Peasants farm 
on precipitous slopes where it is difficult simply to stand. 
Mountainsides said to have been totally forested 20 years ago now 
display patches of slashed and burned earth cleared for planting. 
Farmers seeking new land to cultivate not only climb higher into 
the mountains, but also cultivate river bottom land during the 
dry season, hoping to harvest before the waters rise (See Figure 
Three). As might be expected, such intense cultivation, 
particularly on sloping, marginal lands, has caused erosion and 
gullying. 
Land Distribution 
In Le Borgne, 75 percent of the total population lives on 
farms from one-half to 9-1/2 acres. The land area this group 
controls amounts to 52 percent of the total of farm land, a 
figure relatively high in comparison with national statistics. 
Only 14 Le Borgne families have land holdings of 32 acres 
and over, but they own at least 22 percent of the total land 
area. The figures are unreliable, and almost certainly 
underrepresent the actual holdings of these families. During 
interviews with peasants and town leaders alike, for example, one 
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Figure 3: Map of LcBorgne Parish 
particular family was repeatedly said to hold over 319 acres of 
land, yet records make no mention of this. 
In addition to the microfundia-latifundia division of land 
in the parish, a small middle group owning from 13 to 32 acres 
controls 26 percent of the total land area. They tend to be 
village residents with family land rented or sharecropped by 
others (See Table 4). 
The land title situation in Le Borgne is as vague as it is 
elsewhere in Haiti. The majority of farmers claim to be freehold 
owners of their parcels, but possession of clear title is 
doubtful. As recently as a dozen years ago, farmers in the area 
were losing their land to outsiders arriving from Cap-Haïtien 
with papers giving them title. 
Often, having taken possession, they would then sell the 
land back to the farmer, who would have to go into debt to 
moneylenders to buy it. 
Working the Land 
Freehold farm parcels are by far the most common type of 
tenure (See Table 5). Field data indicates that owner-operated 
plots are clustered mainly in the habitations in the parish's 
peripheral areas. The owner-operators typically work several 
family plots, planting garden crops such as corn, beans, yams, 
and manioc, as well as working some coffee trees. The coffee 
harvest is sold to local speculators, while the food crops are 
consumed at home or sold on the local market. 
These peasant farmers are among the area's poorest 
people. They typically own their home and the plot on which it 
stands, but lack even the basic tools needed for farming. 
Because of this, they have a difficult time working their land 
and making improvements. Since they tend to live in the most 
remote areas, they generally occupy the most inhospitable land. 
Erosion is a grave problem on many of these plots, even though 
peasants are aware of it and have begun to take some steps 
towards combatting it, such as building rudimentary terraces. 
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TABLE FOUR 
LAND DISTRIBUTION IN LE BORGNE (1974/75) 
Size of Holding 
(¡Acres) 
No. of 
People 
No. of 
Families 
Amount of 
Land 
0 1380 326 0 
.4 530 126 50 
.8 1161 220 175 
1.6 1433 259 413 
2.4 367 60 144 
3.19-6.3 1691 284 906 
6.4-12.7 1541 231 1474 
12.75-19 498 69 880 
19.1-31.9 299 43 690 
32-159.5 39 7 233 
160-319 28 7 1117 
Total 8968 1632 60,680 
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But the lack of tools and experience inhibits the effectiveness 
of their action (Charest & Jean-Baptiste: 1976). Clearly, 
however, these attempts demonstrate a willingness to invest in 
the land, if only out of sheer necessity. 
Land in the parish is rented either from the State or from 
an individual owner. In principle, State land is leased to 
peasant farmers yearly for a flat fee. In practice, however, it 
is commonly rented by blocs of, say 30 acres, to someone from the 
village who in turn rents small parcels to peasant farmers—at a 
100 percent profit (See Figure Four). 
Rents must be paid each year. In years of drought or too 
much rain, peasant producers borrow money at usurious interest 
rates—100 percent or more—from money-lenders to pay their rent. 
If they do not pay promptly, their chances of renting good land 
the next year are lessened. Under this system, it is obvious how 
peasants are kept in debt and dependent on those with some 
control over land and capital. 
Rents vary according to the size of plot, quality of land, 
location, and to whom it is being rented, a consideration which 
indicates the role of favoritism in the patron-client 
relationship, another factor which helps promote the "chin man je 
chin" (dog eat dog) relationship among peasants. It is a system 
of control, and as one peasant said, "We've been trapped in this 
system as long as we can remember—our fathers, grandfathers, and 
great-grandfathers . . . " 
In spite of this "chin manje chin" situation, however, and 
contrary to the assumption among most social scientists that 
there is no strong historical basis for cooperative or communal 
farming in Haiti (Zuvekas: 1978a: 260-61), research in Le Borgne 
reveals some types of cooperation. Besides common work by family 
groups, there are several types of work groups in the parish 
which come together on an ad hoc basis, either for a wage or for 
mutual volunteer assistance. Some 35 percent of all peasants 
work in some form of association or group, which provides a basis 
for the formation of peasant agricultural groups. 
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TABLE FIVE 
SELECTED DISTRIBUTION/TENURE OF 
PEASANT HOLDINGS IN LE BORGNE 
Size 
(Acres) 
Number 
Owned 
No. 
Rented 
From 
State 
No. Rented 
From 
Individual Landless 
Total 
No. of 
Holdings 
0 - - - 10 — 
.2-.4 0 0 0 - 0 
.4-.8 5 1 2 - 8 
.8-1.6 11 2 5 - 18 
1.6-2.4 11 3 1 - 15 
2.4-3.2 4 0 0 - 4 
3.2-4.8 6 1 2 - 9 
4.8-6.4 1 0 0 — 1 
6.4-9.6 5 0 0 - 5 
9.6-12.8 3 1 0 - 4 
12.8-16 1 0 0 - 1 
16 and over 2 0 0 - 2 
Total 49 8 10 10 67 
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Figure 4: LeBorgne Parish, Tenure Types 
Tenure Types (Approximate) 
A. State-owned land 
B. Flat land sharecropped 
C. Land rented from " T h e " family 
D. Largely freehold "C la imed" land 
Le Borgne and the Outside 
Le Borgne is isolated at the end of a road impassable when 
the rains fall and barely passable under good weather conditions. 
The road link with the outside is maintained so coffee can be 
extracted and local merchants can procure the few consumer goods 
they sell. The parish is part of an extraction that starts in 
the surrounding habitations in the peasant gardens and ends, 
nationally, in Port-au-Prince. Any wealth concentrated or 
invested in Le Borgne is there in order to facilitate the 
operation of the resource-extraction network. 
Not only is Le Borgne at the end of the extraction sys-
tem, and therefore a net loser of wealth, it also sees its human 
wealth drained away by emigration. Those few local residents who 
go off to secondary school do not often return home after 
finishing. In fact, education is an escape route out of Le 
Borgne. While the parish loses its educated youth to other 
places, it also loses a substantial part of its skilled and 
semi-skilled workers to cities in Haiti, or more commonly, to the 
Bahamas, the U.S., or Canada. Close to two percent of Le 
Borgne1s total population, for example, is now in the Bahamas. 
The pattern of highly centralized decision-making in Haiti, 
even on minor matters, is evident in Le Borgne. Any request or 
petition for public works by local residents will most likely go 
unanswered for two to three years as the request works its way up 
the chain of command and a response—not necessarily 
positive—filters back down to the people. 
Social structure within Le Borgne mirrors the dichotomy 
between town and country typical of Haiti. Wealth and power are 
concentrated—relatively—in the town, where there are five 
distinct groups. At the top of the order are the merchants, 
large landowners, truckowners, priest, and government officials. 
Five or six families dominate this group. Even though their 
decision-making autonomy is limited and largely dependent on 
outside forces, as local gros nègs they exert considerable 
influence over the lives of those in the parish. 
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A second group is composed of local professionals— 
school teachers, and tradesmen such as carpenters, masons, and 
tailors. 
The next three groups are made up of those at the 
bottom—the farmers who live in the town and work their own 
parcels in the country; the charcoal makers; and all the 
marginals, the part-time employed, the landless, those who carry 
things for others. 
There are no women at the lop level except the wives or 
widows in one of the leading families. There are a few 
women professionals, particularly school teachers and 
seamstresses. In general, however, the vast majority of 
women—bakers, small-scale merchants, servants, and market 
women—fall within the same three groups at the bottom as the men 
identified above. 
With the exception of the chef de section, a low-level 
political figure who often works as agent for the land-owning 
gros nèg, men and women in the countryside form one rather 
homogenous group, at the bottom of society's rungs. 
Along with the town-countryside dichotomy in the parish, 
there is also a dichotomy based on "official" and "tolerated" 
cultural characteristics, although it is not as clearly marked as 
in the broad national context. In matters of health, for 
example, the town has no hospitals. Two clinics dispense 
medicine and treat minor ailments, and they are widely consulted. 
But the medical institutions which most affect the vast majority 
of the people of Le Borgne are the "tolerated" ones of the folk 
doctor, the mid-wife, and traditional folk medicines such as 
teas, infusions, and sea baths. 
As for religion, 88 percent of Le Borgne families are 
Catholics, but religious practice is weak. Only 33 percent of 
all Catholics attend weekly masses. Voudou is widely practiced 
and transcends town-countryside distinctions. 
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Few data exist on marriage. But in 1974-75 only 31 
marriages were registered. Common-law marriage therefore must be 
widespread. 
Nor are much data available on Creole vs. French language 
use. Interviews and efforts to speak French suggest that very 
few people in the parish speak it, although many can more or less 
understand it. In all business, governmental, and religious 
activities, however, Creole, the "tolerated" language, is used. 
The people of Le Borgne fit in that 80 percent of the 
Haitian population whose cultural practices and preferences are 
merely "tolerated"—hence in a second*class status. Within their 
milieu, Le Borgne residents practice their culture comfortably. 
When outside, however, peasants commonly lose confidence, sink 
into submissive, withdrawn behavior. 
Within their environment, Haitian peasants have devised many 
strategies and coping mechanisms to survive under conditions of 
extreme poverty and dependence. They organize in various work 
groups for some form of economic gain. But in terms of 
organizations enabling social development, there is little 
activity. There is a lack of local organizations that serve 
peasant development interests. In Le Borgne, the only 
organizations in existence, at the time of the parish survey, 
were the Freemasons and the Catholic Rosary Society, both 
dominated by the local elite. 
Peasants have important farming strategies to help them 
survive. They cultivate several parcels, often in different 
écologie zones, to increase the diversity of their harvest .and to 
gain some insurance against crop failure. 
They manage to get loans when they need them, but as a 
Haitian agronomist pointed out, it is a strategy which offers 
only stop-gap solutions to an immediate problem, leaving peasants 
worse off in the long run. 
Migration offers some escape for a lucky few, and per-
haps through the remittances they send home, some economic gain 
for those staying behind. But migration does not lead to human 
or social change in the parish. In fact, the effects are 
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negative as the process tends to drain off the more energetic, 
which must retard the community's development. 
Peasants also seek to establish a benevolent relationship 
with a powerful landlord or merchant. To seek favor of such a 
patron, a peasant may ask him to be godfather to his children, 
go out of his way to patronize a merchant's store, or may even 
pay a landowner more rent than that due. But these strategies, 
while facilitating survival, do nothing to change the basic 
relationships that keep peasants dependent and underdeveloped. 
Hence, underdevelopment among the peasants of Le Borgne parish 
reflects the general problem in Haiti. Given the conditions 
under which they live, it is not surprising that Le Borgne 
peasants, like those throughout Haiti, identify a long list of 
development needs, including the need for justice. Given the 
inability of the peasant strategies described above to funda-
mentally change social and economic relationships, there is no 
doubt that the situation was ripe in Le Borgne for a facilitator 
organization to step in and work at the base to begin a process 
leading to higher levels of justice. 
IDEA has been active in Le Borgne, sponsoring various 
activities that touch the peasantry, for several years. It has 
given the initial push to a group of animation agents from Le 
Borgne to begin a grass-roots, parish-wide community development 
program called the Movement for the Development of the Community 
of Le Borgne (M0DECB0). What follows is a description of this 
project—its evolution, operating principles, and activities—and 
an analysis of its impact in facilitating human development in 
Le Borgne through changes in social and economic relationships. 
The question is whether this strategy, unlike those followed by 
the two development organizations described above, can enable 
peasants to rid themselves of the injustices that keep them 
underdeveloped and engage in a process of meaningful and 
sustained development for themselves. 
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IDEA 
IDEA was established in 1973 as an institute for peasant 
leadership training. It is a Roman Catholic church-supported 
organization with headquarters at the College of Notre Dame in 
Cap-Haitien. Its programs draw participants from over 40 
communities throughout the north. 
IDEA'S staff of about 25 is half full-time, paid employees 
and half part-time volunteer workers. Virtually all are 
Haitians, most from the north. The director and founder of IDEA 
is a Haitian priest who is also principal of the College. 
Funding comes primarily from the Inter-American Foundation, 
although IDEA does receive funds from other secular and 
church-based development foundations. Essentially, IDEA is a 
local, private, facilitator organization. 
As a facilitator, IDEA is not directly involved in com-
munity activities. Rather it trains peasants to work as agents 
for social change and development in their own communities. 
Hence, although IDEA is active with leadership programs at both 
regional and community levels, it does not provide resources, 
material, or technical assistance beyond leadership training. 
Its main contribution is exactly what the acronym spells—ideas. 
IDEA'S roots go back to a 1963 College-sponsored summer 
course aimed at understanding peasant life. Course leaders and 
students came into direct and intimate contact—most of them for 
the first time—with the absolute poverty of the peasants. 
Subsequent discussion among the participants and later, other 
students, led to an increased collective understanding of 
underdevelopment and its debilitating effect, but no significant 
activity. In the early 1970s, however, in a new climate of 
thought and action in part sparked by changes in certain 
theological perspectives, the current director of IDEA along with 
several other persons, some of whom were engaged in community 
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development efforts, decided that change could best be promoted 
by focussing on those people who were committed—by choice or 
necessity—to continue living in the rural areas. 
From the start, IDEA'S staff tried to provide training that 
would enable peasants to play an active role. There were already 
development projects in progress in the north. IDEA'S staff felt 
these well-meaning activities tend to focus on sectoral change, 
without simultaneous human development. Peasants were involved 
only as "work-horses" without any real understanding of, or 
participation in, the projects. IDEA identified the basic need 
as "peasant formation" through which peasants would acquire the 
skills and understanding needed to understand processes, identify 
needs, and work together for change. The goal would be to 
develop people before things. 
IDEA'S perspectives were that: 
• there was a sharp dichotomy in Haitian society between the 
dominating and the dominated; 
• development meant changes in this basically uneven social 
and economic relationship; 
• efforts at change must come from those who are dominated, 
i.e., the peasant base; and 
• there was a severe leadership vacuum at the base that 
inhibited change. 
Based on these perspectives, IDEA developed a program based 
on animation, conscientization, and group formation. 
Its peasant leadership programs deal with such topics as 
community health, development, Haitian sociology, cooperation, 
causes of peasant problems, and agronomy. The trainees gain a 
new awareness of themselves, of groups and of group process. As 
they become aware of the cause and dynamic of the domination 
under which they live, they question their acceptance of their 
"natural" status of underdevelopment and dependency. By 
stressing the fact that there do exist community solutions to 
community problems, a sense of self-worth is instilled. 
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Training classes stress participation and involvement rather 
than instruction to be received passively. Creole is used 
exclusively, and field experience is emphasized. Participants do 
not receive diplomas because "in our underdeveloped country, 
people attach too much importance to diplomas, and not enough to 
the value of the person" (IDEA: 1975). 
After the leadership training, the social change agents, or 
animators, return to their communities to engage in "conscien-
tization." Using the skills and understandings gained, they 
try to stimulate fellow peasants to understand their reality and 
become active in changing it. They encourage community members 
to meet together, discuss problems, and attempt to find ways 
among themselves to solve problems. As part of this process, 
peasants are encouraged to form community development groups 
where individuals can pool resources, skills, and energy. Through 
membership in these groups, peasants begin to forge new social 
and economic relationships that give them the ability and the 
power to make changes. 
IDEA offers four leadership training programs—a three-week 
course, a mobile animation team, a 15-day seminar, and the 
10-month course. 
The three-week program, held at a training center in the 
village of Milot, has a full-time staff of five conducting 
intensive animation sessions with groups of 40 peasants. The 
peasants come in groups of 10 from different communities. They 
are selected by a community sponsor, often a community 
development group or a cleric. After the program, they return to 
their community where they engage in conscientization with other 
peasants and serve as auxiliaries to the full-time social change 
agents• 
The mobile team has three trained animators who visit 
villages throughout the north, stay a^week at each site, and 
conduct animation sessions with community groups* 
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The 15-day seminars are geared to professionals working in a 
rural setting. They are conducted by the same staff that leads 
the 10-month program, and they seek to encourage professionals to 
support the social change agents in their work. 
The 10-month program is IDEA1 s keystone. Some 30 
peasant leaders participate in each course. They come from 
communities throughout the north, and occasionally from other 
parts of Haiti. Selection criteria are rigorous, and IDEA works 
closely with local sponsors to choose candidates who must: 
• be 18 years or older; 
• read and write in Creole; 
• be free from overwhelming family or professional 
responsibilities ; 
• be from a community where the sponsor can furnish some 
support when the animator returns to begin conscientization 
work; 
• have previously been active in community development 
activities; 
• come to IDEA with community, not individual, interests in 
mind; 
• have a "spirit of service;" and 
• be in good health. 
During the 10-month course, the participant is exposed to 
several subjects to prepare, not a specialist in any one 
particular field, but rather someone who can expose a com-
munity to a variety of ideas to facilitate group organization and 
development. The 10-month program includes field work after 
every two months of classes. 
At the time this study was made, over 150 animators had 
completed the 10-month program and returned to their com-
munities to engage in full-time conscientization and group 
formation. They are not leaders as such, but rather guides and 
catalysts, helping peasants identify and plan activities. IDEA 
has now touched over 40 communities in the north of Haiti with 
its various programs. 
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The parish of Le Borgne provides an example of how IDEA 
works. Four persons from the parish have completed IDEA'S 
10-month training program. Several groups of 10 peasants from 
habitations and the town have participated in the three-week 
course at Milot, and the mobile animation team has visited Le 
Borgne four times. 
IDEA activities in Le Borgne began in 1973 when the 
parish's Roman Catholic priest agreed to sponsor two persons for 
IDEA'S initial 10-month program. After training, the two 
returned to Le Borgne in mid-1974 to begin activities that 
eventually led to the formation of M0DECB0—the Movement for the 
Development of the Community of Le Borgne. 
The two animators had to start from scratch. While a third 
person from the town attended another 10-month program, they 
planned and conducted an in-depth parish survey, using techniques 
learned in training. By asking questions on education, family, 
habitation economics, health, and religion, the animators not 
only pinpointed peasant problems, but also made themselves 
visible, their work understood, and thus embarked on the 
conscientization-group formation process. Significantly, while 
the survey was being conducted, 22 of today's community groups, 
with membership totalling 1,150, first formed, evolving out of 
meetings throughout the parish to discuss the survey and its 
tentative findings. 
By 1976 survey data had been completed and released. The 
third animator had completed training and returned to the parish, 
and the mobile team had paid several visits to habitations. 
Several groups of 10 peasants were selected from the incipient 
groups throughout the parish to attend the three-week intensive 
animation session at Milot, then returned to form a link between 
the animators and the community development groups. In mid-1976, 
one of the participants in a three-week program left his 
habitation to attend the 10-month training. 
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Although IDEA sought to reach the base of the parish and 
stimulate peasant-initiated development, its first recruits did 
not come from the bottom of Le Borgne society. The first three 
animators were all teachers, one of them a nun. The fourth 
animator, however, comes directly from a rural community group, 
as do participants in the three-week program and the mobile team 
programs. 
IDEA started where it did because of the lack of able 
participants from the base. As those first selected were able 
to "conscientize" peasants and groups formed, IDEA began to 
recruit directly from the base. Throughout, the parish priest 
played a key coordinating role. 
The result, after three years of activities, was the 
beginning of a grass-roots development process in which peasants 
identified needs, formed groups, and began to take action on 
their own initiative. They began to construct meeting places, 
deal with the lack of potable water, and discuss future actions. 
At that point, the animators saw the need for operating capital 
to enable the groups to enter into a sustained development 
process. Thus, with the framework established, the animators 
presented a funding proposal to the Inter-American Foundation in 
late 1976. 
MODECBO 
The request to IAF was for a relatively modest ($62,778) 
amount of capital. The plan, evolved from development needs 
identified by peasants during the survey, was to establish an 
agricultural pre-cooperative and credit union from the nascent 
community groups. In early 1977, IAF approved a two-year grant 
to MODECBO. In the meantime, the fourth animator had joined the 
team, and several more community groups had formed, bringing the 
total to 27. 
Essentially, the community development project aims to 
enable peasant producers to control the marketing and pro-
cessing of their production. The first step is the formation of 
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the agricultural pre-cooperative and credit union based on the 
community groups. The IAF grant provides funds to: 
• establish a land rental fund, 
• expand a seed and tool bank, 
• construct a storage warehouse, and 
• pay the animators an $80 a month salary as well as the 
costs of leadership seminars. 
The steps in forming the pre-cooperative include set-
ting up community gardens, expanding a savings club, pro-
viding an intensive educational program, and developing a storage 
and marketing capability. The members of each community group 
divided into agricultural work groups of 10-15 members to lease 
about one hectare (2.2 acres) of land and farm it communally. 
Profits were to be used to augment the reserve or land rental 
fund for the pre-cooperative, for the education programs, and to 
purchase shares in the credit union. The already existing tool 
bank was to be expanded. 
The savings clubs began with the formation of the groups. 
At each meeting, members deposited a small sum in savings 
accounts. With the formation of the agricultural sub-groups or 
teams, these accounts became part of the credit union. 
The communal garden offered peasants an opportunity not only 
to work together and realize some economic gain, but also to 
experiment and try innovations without changing their low-risk 
farming strategies. Successful innovations and experiments can 
subsequently be tried on individual land without great risk. The 
communal gardens thus serve as experimental farms for the 
peasants. 
The key to the development envisaged here was group 
formation and the process of education and conscientization that 
allows the group to evolve deliberately through various stages. 
Implicit in this evolution is the gradual assumption of all 
decision-making and planning by the members. In the meantime, 
the animators act as catalysts. Ideally, they eventually work 
themselves out of a job. 
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With only a little more than a year elapsed since MODECBO 
received the funding enabling it to activate this program, 
it is premature to present any full and final analysis of the 
project. On the basis of the developments of the first year, 
however, it is possible to begin the analysis of its impact. 
First, MODECBO has avoided many of the pitfalls which have 
afflicted other development efforts. It is an indigenous group. 
The individuals who comprise its staff of six—four animators, an 
agronomist and a literacy specialist—with one exception, are not 
outsiders. They are known throughout the parish, have extensive 
kinship ties, do not lack a sense of security. They are 
intimately familiar with the place, its people, and its cultural 
and socio-economic characteristics. 
There are no functionaries or experts over-seeing the 
program from beyond the parish. The priest, as advisor, is 
locally-based, and does not have veto power. No one has 
descended from the outside to impose a structure or implant 
technology. The only real outside thrust in the project, apart 
from IDEA, is the operating capital received from IAF, which does 
not intervene in planning, decision-making, or implementation. 
Second, peasant participation is an integral element. 
MODECBO plays a leading role in the identification of needs, 
planning, and management. Yet, because the MODECBO team is from 
the parish, and the evolution of the team's basic development 
philosophy is nurtured by IDEA, peasant participation is far from 
neglected. The team members are either directly from the 
peasantry, or have strong ties to it. There has been a tendency, 
among team members from the town, to remain somewhat aloof when 
working with peasants, to act as a leader rather than a catalyst. 
But team members are aware of this and see it as a problem, which 
in itself is an important change. Moreover, the presence on the 
team of people from the peasantry balances this tendency. 
Within the peasant groups, identification of needs, planning 
and management is solely in the hands of the members. Management 
of savings clubs, formation of agricultural teams, selection of 
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officers, and implementation are all peasant managed. The 
animators are occasionally present at group meetings, and guide 
and advise peasant actions, but they do not make decisions for 
the members. It is well understood that strong peasant par-
ticipation is a project goal in itself. Time and again, during 
meetings and seminars, peasants are urged to participate. 
Peasant members themselves urge each other to participate, and on 
several occasions have said that their mere sitting down together 
to discuss problems is a great improvement over the past when the 
"chin man je chin" worlcfjriew kept them separated. 
Third, MODECBO seeks change by first initiating change in 
social and economic relationships. In the formation of groups 
and subsequent activities such as the election of officers, 
dialogue among members, participation in savings clubs and 
agricultural work groups, basic relationships are changed as 
members work together and pool resources, talent, and energy. 
MODECBO's overall objective is fundamental change whereby 
peasant producers can free themselves from dependence on 
speculators, money-lenders and négociants by exercising control 
over their own production. Of course, as part of this changing 
relationship, there will be changes in places and things. The 
construction of the warehouse, for example, is one such change. 
But for MODECBO, the warehouse is not the end, but rather a means 
to reach the end of greater peasant control over resources, and 
ultimately of real and sustained development of the people at the 
bottom. 
Fourth, MODECBO activities are not dependent on the 
introduction of technology. Indeed, a basic principle is to find 
and use existing resources and technology to solve community 
problems. Some technology is included however. The tool bank, 
for example, makes tools available to peasants on a rotating 
basis. Certainly to most of them, shovels, picks, and hoes are 
not new technology. But having access to them on a regular basis 
is unprecedented. 
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Fifth, the introduction of cooperatives, savings clubs, and 
a credit union to fulfill peasant needs represents new and 
abstract ideas that have to be understood by peasants before they 
can decide to actively participate in them. The M0DECB0 team as 
well as peasant group members recognize that this is a slow, 
evolutionary process achieved through constant and growing 
participation in the conscientization program. 
It appears then, from its plan and from what has happened 
during its first year, that MODECBO has taken some significant 
steps. Peasant participation in and understanding of all aspects 
of MODECBO is already significant and promises to become more so 
as the project evolves. New relationships within the parish are 
already being created. Specific activities are beginning to chip 
away—admittedly slowly—at the structure of injustice and the 
specific institutions and practices that keep peasants poor and 
dependent. 
The most debilitating constraint to peasant agricultural 
development—insecurity of tenure—is being attacked indirectly. 
Because peasant organization and power is only incipient, while 
that of the landowners is real, there is an obvious need to go 
slow so as not to be crushed. Progress so far is minimal, but a 
framework is apparently being built to enable more significant 
actions in the future. One indirect attack on the tenure 
problem is a program to train a cadre of literacy instructors, 
one from each group, who in turn conduct regular literacy classes 
in Creole with fellow group members. Peasants who are learning 
to read and write are enabled to combat certain areas of 
injustice where illiteracy presently leaves them defenseless 
before the unscrupulous. 
A specific example concerns birth, death, and marriage 
certificates. No longer can exorbitant fees be collected from 
peasants who read, write, demonstrate an understanding of the 
rules of the game, and demand that they be treated fairly. Armed 
with new self-confidence and skills, peasants are now able to 
overcome at least this facet of exploitation. 
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The implications of literacy for the land tenure question 
are great. Written contracts with landlords will be understood 
and thus can be demanded with greater confidence. Title papers, 
where they do exist, will be understood and interlopers with 
false papers more easily repulsed. By reading and writing 
Creole, peasants are in the vanguard of a movement of Haitian 
academics and intellectuals to install Creole as the legitimate 
Haitian national language. 
Of course there are limits. A peasant, even if he can read, 
is still quite powerless. So group formation plays a critical 
role in the indirect attack against injustices centering around 
land tenure. In the groups, the ongoing discussion of needs and 
problems that is part of the conscientization process appears to 
bring peasant members to new levels of awareness and under-
standing of the underdevelopment of which they are victims. 
Serious and explicit criticisms of landlords by peasants at 
meetings demonstrate this newly grasped awareness of the 
exploitative system and the need to change it. It appears that 
peasants are beginning to place faith in their strength as a 
group. The agricultural sub-groups, or teams, allow this faith 
to be put into practice. 
Originally, the teams were to lease roughly two acres of 
land to farm collectively. This had to be changed when 
landlords, learning the teams had money for rentals, increased 
the rates to absurd levels, as high as $100 a year for less than 
three acres of non-prime land. With the guidance of the 
animators, the teams created a scheme whereby each member gives 
over a small section of his own garden to the group, which works 
it collectively. This innovation was quite recent and so it is 
too early to judge its effectiveness, but the fact that peasants 
were actively involved in the planning shows a significant 
improvement over the past. 
At present, the teams are working together and building a 
sense of solidarity and belonging that will certainly be needed 
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to change land tenure arrangements, since action in this area 
must eventually confront established power. The first step in 
peasant organization is being achieved. When an 18-year-old 
peasant says, "to me, the group is like my mother and my father; 
if something happens to me, it will come to my aid," 
considerable change has taken place • 
Almost as debilitating to peasant agricultural development 
as tenure insecurity is the credit situation. Its exploitative 
character keeps peasants trapped in the vicious cycle of 
underdevelopment and dependency. MODECBO is helping peasants 
break out of this cycle. There is now some capital available to 
members through the savings clubs. The interest-free loans, 
though small and not an everyday occurrence, are unprecedented 
among peasants. They help at least; some peasants avoid the money 
lenders. As the groups evolve to more advanced stages of the 
agricultural pre-cooperative, more capital will be available 
through the credit unions. 
The use of Creole in the literacy program assists in the 
legitimation of peasant culture, a s do other MODECBO activities. 
By encouraging group formation and the idea that there are 
community solutions to community problems, that local technology 
and resources are useful and valuable, and that the individual is 
capable of changing his situation, new levels of self-confidence 
and resolve appear. This is an elusive area to measure but some 
comments by group members give indications of those high levels 
of confidence: 
". . .The group helps us have pride in ourselves." 
" • . .We help each other when help is needed and we can 
depend on the other members of the group." 
" . . .The authorities today cannot do things as they used to 
do. We are beginning to insist on our rights." 
". . .We were forced to do whatever was imposed on us. Now 
we decided what we are going to do after having discussed it 
together. We have meetings with the animators who show us that 
we are our own problem-solvers" (Lamy: 1978). 
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Finally, starts are being made on the fundamental ques-
tion of the distribution of wealth and services: 
• the lessening dependence on money lenders and speculators 
means greater control of resources by peasants; 
• the warehouse for crop storage, now built, will enable 
peasant producers to avoid flooding the market at harvest 
and to reserve some of the harvest until the time prices 
rise to their normal levels; and 
• the literacy centers built by each group represent the 
first appearance of educational facilities in the 
habitations. 
In the context of the debilitating levels of under-
development and dependency which peasants endure, these seemingly 
minor advancements represent significant changes. In a situation 
where peasants never worked together cooperatively except in kin 
groups or for a wage, the mere fact that they discuss problems in 
a group is an accomplishment. 
There are, however, potentially important problem areas. 
There is still the tendency, more pronounced in the town than in 
the country, to think of development in terms of an 
infrastructure change—digging a canal, clearing a road, building 
a bridge—that is beyond a group1s current capacity and 
resources. This tendency could lead to frustration and possibly 
to the demise of a group. Conscientization, if properly 
practiced, should avoid this problem, since groups are encouraged 
to look for solutions using local and available resources.t 
There is also a tendency for town-based groups to be less 
active in project activities. If town groups become 
significantly distinct from habitation groups, the town-country 
dichotomy so widespread in Haiti will continue, making community 
development in a real sense impossible. 
Summary and Lessons 
In Le Borgne, IDEA-trained animators are achieving moderate, 
growing success in facilitating grass-roots development. Yet the 
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situation at Le Borgne is far from typical of the universal 
impact of IDEA 'S development efforts. At Le Borgne, there were 
several conditions that helped IDEA'S interventions have the 
impact that led to the creation of MODECBO. The animation team 
is highly motivated and deeply committed to the parish and its 
people. The priest and sponsor assumed a supportive role that 
enabled the animators to function effectively in their capacity 
as full-time social change agents. 
In other instances IDEA has had mixed success in 
facilitating a grass-roots development program. Some of its 
animators have been less effective. Several factors can limit 
animators ' effectiveness• 
First, the sponsor, whether an individual or a group, is a 
key factor. IDEA depends on the sponsor to assist in identifying 
candidates for training programs and to provide support after 
training. In Le Borgne, this support was crucial in enabling the 
project to get off the ground. In many cases, however, this 
arrangement has not worked out and animators are not able to 
function effectively. Sometimes the original sponsor is no 
longer present when the animator returns, leaving him or her 
without material or moral support. In other cases, the sponsor 
has not supported a returned animator either because of a lack of 
resources or a change of heart. In still other cases, the 
sponsor has attempted to co-opt the animator into other tasks. 
Without effective support, animators have to devote most of their 
energies to their own subsistance, leaving little time for 
community development work. 
A second key factor is the initiative of the animator. Even 
with the backing of a sponsor, most animators have gone about 
their tasks without much material support. To the credit of both 
IDEA, which instilled the spirit and resolve, and the animators 
themselves, who persevere and improvise, most seem to work 
doggedly at facilitating development without much to back them 
up. Of course, there is a good deal that can be accomplished 
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without extensive resources, but animators sooner or later reach 
a stage where, without minimal resources, they are blocked from 
implementing needed activities. 
The nature of the skills animators possess is another 
factor. Animators receive general training on group process, 
conscientization, and formation, and a smattering of basic 
technical skills in agronomy, health, cooperatives, and 
economics. As catalysts, an in-depth knowledge of a particular 
skill is not absolutely necessary. Skills existing in the 
community, and adaptions of local technical knowledge, are 
sufficient to enable animators to begin the development process. 
There is a point, however, where the generalist nature of an 
animator's skills becomes inadequate. Building a solid stone 
terrace on a steep slope, keeping credit union books, or writing 
a project proposal for funding may present challenges beyond the 
animator's skills. Either more specialized training must be 
available, or animators must have access to individuals with the 
needed skills. 
A fourth factor is coordination among IDEA'S programs. The 
four training programs IDEA offers are designed to complement 
each other and provide a community with a group of individuals 
who coordinate their activities. Unfortunately, this 
coordination is often lacking. Sometimes geographical 
constraints keep various IDEA-trained individuals from 
uniting. Petty jealousies and misunderstanding may sometimes 
separate individuals. There is a clear need for more attention 
to coordination of programs and people at the community level. 
A fifth factor is the strength of the continuing tendency to 
seek infrastructural change too early. In spite of a training 
program stressing local solutions for local problems, there 
remains a strong tendency for social change agents to view a 
technologically sophisticated approach focussed on infrastructure 
change as desirable. 
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A final factor is the nature of what IDEA is attempting, and 
the inherent fragility of such an attempt. Efforts at meaningful 
and sustained changes in social and economic relationships 
challenge the structure of power in Haiti. For facilitators to 
accomplish their goals, they must be free to function in an 
atmosphere of at least tolerance, if not support. Each step must 
be well-planned and taken with care. 
IDEA recognizes these problems. In the past, the 
organization has been able to change its program to cope with 
other problems and weaknesses. Surely, it is now seeking to 
design strategies to cope with these problems. If it can do so, 
its success as a facilitator in development will be greatly 
increased. Its success to date indicates that the approach IDEA 
takes to the challenge of development is a valid one. That 
approach has evolved from certain conditions and is based on 
certain values. It grew out of a specific milieu, Haiti's north, 
and deals with specific problems. It is not the answer to all 
development problems. But to the extent that IDEA has had some 
success in a country where the problems of underdevelopment are 
as severe and overwhelming as anywhere in the world, the IDEA 
approach deserves serious consideration by all those interested 
in coping with those problems. 
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t The following anecdote demonstrates the tendency to deal with 
problems through infrastructural change and almost overlook 
conscientization as a means of coping with a problem. In one of 
the neighborhoods of Le Borgne where there is a MODECBO group, 
there is a communal water spigot. By the spigot is a run-off 
trough that created mud puddles, causing a general nuisance in 
the neighborhood. The group decided to take some action; they 
dug a rudimentary drainage ditch by the spigot. Within a week it 
was filled in by sediment from the run-off and the situation was 
the same, so the group re-dug the small canal. Lots of 
undisciplined energy was expended as group members, without much 
planning, enthusiastically dug away with any tool that they could 
lay their hands on. In another week the canal was again filled, 
and the group was frustrated because they did not have materials 
to build a 11 proper" canal. Complacency set in. The canal was an 
attempt to change the infrastructure and deal with the effects of 
the problem. The cause of the problem—people letting the water 
run down into the street—was not attacked. One does not need 
resources to attack this problem and treat its cause. Only after 
tooth-pulling discussions did the group members and animators 
think of attacking the cause. If conscientization works as it 
should, there would have been no immediate urge to dig a ditch. 
Rather, the first inclination would be to discuss the problem to 
identify its cause and see what could be done using the people 
and resources on hand to solve it. In this case, it simply means 
conscientizing people not to leave the spigot open, thus allowing 
the run-off to create a mud-puddle problem. 
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